torqvoice/prisma/schema/auth.prisma

model User {
  id            String   @id @default(cuid())
  name          String
  email         String   @unique
  emailVerified Boolean  @default(false)
  /// The mobile a technician signs in with, and the number a workshop holds
  /// for whoever this is.
  ///
  /// Deliberately not unique. When a desk creates an account for a mechanic
  /// standing at the counter, a second workshop may create another for the
  /// same human, and neither should be able to block the other. Every lookup
  /// reaches it through a technician row and so is already scoped to one
  /// workshop; the number alone is never the question being asked.
  phone         String?
  image         String?
  isSuperAdmin  Boolean  @default(false)
  createdAt     DateTime @default(now())
  updatedAt     DateTime @updatedAt

  twoFactorEnabled    Boolean   @default(false)
  termsAcceptedAt     DateTime?
  lastLogin           DateTime?
  lastSeen            DateTime?
  /// App version this user last saw/dismissed the update banner for.
  /// Null = never seeded (seeded silently on first load, no banner).
  lastSeenVersion     String?
  /// The release the update banner is up for, and when it first appeared to
  /// this user on any device. The hour it stays up runs from here, so a
  /// second device does not restart them and a closed tab cannot stop them.
  updateBannerVersion String?
  updateBannerShownAt DateTime?
  /// When this user last opened the "What's new" panel. Entries published
  /// after it (and after the account was created) carry the unread dot.
  whatsNewSeenAt      DateTime?
  /// Per-user dashboard grid layout (card positions/sizes/hidden set).
  /// Null = default layout. Shape validated in dashboardLayoutActions.
  dashboardLayout     Json?

  sessions                 Session[]
  devices                  UserDevice[]
  accounts                 Account[]
  pushDevices              PushDevice[]
  appSetupCodes            TechnicianSetupCode[]
  vehicles                 Vehicle[]
  customers                Customer[]
  settings                 AppSetting[]
  inventoryParts           InventoryPart[]
  quotes                   Quote[]
  customFieldDefinitions   CustomFieldDefinition[]
  twoFactor                TwoFactor?
  passkeys                 Passkey[]
  organizationMembers      OrganizationMember[]
  dashboardWidgets         DashboardWidget[]
  auditLogs                AuditLog[]
  openedServiceRecords     ServiceRecord[]           @relation("ServiceRecordCreatedBy")
  confirmedConcerns        ServiceConcern[]          @relation("ConcernConfirmedBy")
  appointmentsCreated      Appointment[]             @relation("AppointmentCreatedBy")
  appointmentNotifications AppointmentNotification[] @relation("AppointmentNotificationUser")
  recordedConditionMarks   ConditionMark[]           @relation("ConditionMarkRecordedBy")
  resolvedConditionMarks   ConditionMark[]           @relation("ConditionMarkResolvedBy")
  technicians              Technician[]
  stockMovements           StockMovement[]
  tireWarehouses           TireWarehouse[]
  tireSets                 TireSet[]
  tireSetAttachments       TireSetAttachment[]
  tireMeasurements         TireMeasurement[]
  tireMovements            TireMovement[]
  tireTreatments           TireTreatment[]
  importBatches            ImportBatch[]

  @@map("users")
}

model Session {
  id        String   @id @default(cuid())
  expiresAt DateTime
  token     String   @unique
  createdAt DateTime @default(now())
  updatedAt DateTime @updatedAt
  ipAddress String?
  userAgent String?

  userId String
  user   User   @relation(fields: [userId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)

  /// The one workshop this session may act in, for sessions minted without a
  /// password: an app setup code from the desk, or a one-time code sent to a
  /// technician's phone. Null for every ordinary sign-in.
  ///
  /// Those sessions are handed out on a workshop's say-so, and a workshop can
  /// only vouch for itself. Left unscoped, the token was the person's whole
  /// account: whoever redeemed a setup code could name any other workshop the
  /// technician belongs to in a header and act there with their role. When
  /// this is set it is the workshop, and no header or cookie can choose
  /// another. Removing the workshop ends the session with it.
  organizationId String?
  organization   Organization? @relation(fields: [organizationId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)

  @@index([userId])
  @@index([organizationId])
  @@map("sessions")
}

model Account {
  id                    String    @id @default(cuid())
  accountId             String
  providerId            String
  userId                String
  user                  User      @relation(fields: [userId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
  accessToken           String?
  refreshToken          String?
  idToken               String?
  accessTokenExpiresAt  DateTime?
  refreshTokenExpiresAt DateTime?
  scope                 String?
  password              String?
  createdAt             DateTime  @default(now())
  updatedAt             DateTime  @updatedAt

  @@index([userId])
  @@map("accounts")
}

model Verification {
  id         String    @id @default(cuid())
  identifier String    @unique
  value      String
  expiresAt  DateTime
  createdAt  DateTime? @default(now())
  updatedAt  DateTime? @updatedAt

  @@map("verifications")
}

model TwoFactor {
  id                      String    @id @default(cuid())
  secret                  String
  backupCodes             String
  userId                  String    @unique
  user                    User      @relation(fields: [userId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
  // better-auth's two-factor plugin writes these three since 1.6: a secret
  // stays unverified until the first code is entered, and repeated wrong
  // codes lock the method for a while. Rows from before default to verified,
  // because those people already proved their app worked.
  verified                Boolean   @default(true)
  failedVerificationCount Int       @default(0)
  lockedUntil             DateTime?

  @@map("two_factor")
}

model Passkey {
  id           String   @id @default(cuid())
  name         String?
  publicKey    String
  userId       String
  user         User     @relation(fields: [userId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
  credentialID String   @unique
  counter      Int
  deviceType   String
  backedUp     Boolean
  transports   String?
  aaguid       String?
  createdAt    DateTime @default(now())

  @@index([userId])
  @@map("passkeys")
}

/// A browser or phone this person has signed in from before.
///
/// Sessions come and go (sign-out, expiry, a password change that ends the
/// others), so the session table cannot say whether a device is new; this can.
/// A browser is known by a random id in a long-lived cookie, set the first
/// time it signs in; a client without cookies, such as the technician app,
/// is known by its user agent. The first device an account ever sees is
/// recorded quietly; every later one earns a "new sign-in" mail.
model UserDevice {
  id          String   @id @default(cuid())
  /// Cookie id, or a hash of the user agent when no cookie can be kept.
  deviceKey   String
  userAgent   String?
  lastIp      String?
  firstSeenAt DateTime @default(now())
  lastSeenAt  DateTime @default(now())

  userId String
  user   User   @relation(fields: [userId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)

  @@unique([userId, deviceKey])
  @@index([userId])
  @@map("user_devices")
}